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ENERGY TRANSITIONS AND THE FUTURE OF
NUCLEAR ENERGY: A CASE FOR SMALL
MODULAR REACTORS
Carl Stenberg*
11 WASH. J. ENV’T. L. & POL’Y 57 (2020)
ABSTRACT
The world is undergoing a global energy transition that will
transform societies from fossil-fuel dependency towards clean energy
solutions to meet future energy demand. An assumption is that nuclear
energy, as a low-emissions energy source, could play a vital role in a
clean, low-carbon future. Most reactors operating in the United States
today are large custom-made reactors (LRs). Because of unfair riskperceptions and the forced internalization of negative externalities, LRs
and nuclear energy industry have long-struggled to compete with other
energy sources.
The deployment of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) make up for
many of the inherent problems that exist in the traditional focus of the
nuclear industry. SMRs offer technological advancements and potential
opportunities to overcome certain obstacles of the dreaded licensing
*

Carl Stenberg graduated with an LL.B. from Queen Mary University of London School
of Law in 2019, and with an LL.M. in Global Energy from The University of Texas at
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process that has hampered nuclear growth in the United States. In the
context of the current energy transition and the problems of conventional
reactors, the case for the deployment of SMRs presents an opportunity
for the next nuclear renaissance in the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Energy Transition: A Brief Overview
Transitioning from fossil fuels to alternative energy sources is
arguably one of the most significant challenges facing modern society to
date.1 In the special report “Global Warming of 1.5 ºC” the International
Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) claims it is necessary to reduce
global carbon emissions by 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030,2 and
net zero must be reached by 2050, to mitigate the effects of climate
change.3 The scientific consensus of human activities’ effect on climate
change,4 has spurred a global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions
(“GHGs”). This has been labeled as the “energy transition.”5 The
problem of reducing emissions becomes further difficult considering that
world demand for energy is expected to increase at least until the year
2050,6 and the current cheapest source of reliable energy remains carbonbased.7 Global demand for oil has also seen a steady increase despite
efforts to reduce fossil-fuel dependency.8
1

Mike Munsell, Energy Transition in 4 Charts, A Peek at Wood Mackenzie’s Latest
Outlooks for Solar, Wind Energy Storage and Carbon Emissions, GREEN TECH MEDIA
(Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-energy-transition-incharts.
2
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], Global Warming of 1.5°C, at 12,
Valerie Masson-Delmotte (IPCC Working Group, Co-Chair) et al. (2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pd
f. See also Climate Reality Project, 2030 or Bust: 5 Key Takeaways from the IPCC,
CLIMATE REALITY PROJECT (Oct. 18, 2018, 9:35 AM),
https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/2030-or-bust-5-key-takeaways-ipcc-report.
The IPCC is an intergovernmental organization consisting of over 195 member states,
that assess the current scientific data on climate change to find objective and accurate
scientific data.
3
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, supra note 2, at 12
4
NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., SCIENTIFIC CONSENSUS: EARTH’S CLIMATE IS
WARMING, https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/.
5
“The energy transition is a pathway toward transformation of the global energy sector
from fossil-based to zero-carbon by the second half of this century. At its heart is the
need to reduce energy-related CO2 emissions to limit climate change.” Int’l Renewable
Energy Agency [IRENA], Energy Transition, https://www.irena.org/energytransition (last
visited Mar. 9, 2020).
6
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EIA PROJECTS NEARLY 50% INCREASE IN WORLD ENERGY
USAGE BY 2050, LED BY GROWTH IN ASIA, (2019),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41433.
7
See Levelized Cost of Energy, LAZARD (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.lazard.com/perspective/lcoe2019. Both Coal and Gas Combined Cycle
remain more expansive than nuclear on a Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) comparison.
8
EIA’s International Energy Outlook Shows Demand for Fossil Fuels Increasing, INST.
FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Sep. 30, 2019),
59
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There are many climate and non-climate related costs associated with
the combustion of fossil fuels.9 It is estimated that the annual non-climate
related external damages from the 406 coal-fired power plants in the
United States result in costs of tens of billion USD.10 Thus, one study has
found that considering non-GHG air pollution, both oil and coal-fired
power plants are a net negative on a cost basis for society, but not gas.11
The effects of climate change will also generate high costs for
society and the global economy at large.12 According to the Stern Review
commissioned by the British government, models have shown that the
impact of climate change may have a grave impact on global GDP.13
Similar research shows that the United States will incur high costs from
the effects of climate change as well.14 Since these models are attempting
to predict the future, there is also a real risk of cost escalation because
the effects of climate change are not yet fully understood.15
Acknowledging the reality of these costs has fueled the global effort to
reduce dependency on fossil fuels, and in turn, led to a global ambition
for a cleaner future. However, the energy transition and efforts by nationstates have not yet been proven successful enough to generate sufficient
https://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/international-issues/eias-international-energyoutlook-shows-demand-for-fossil-fuels-increasing/.
9
Air Pollution from Fossil Fuels Costs $ Billion Per Day, New Research Finds, YALE
ENV’T. 360 (Feb. 12, 2020), https://e360.yale.edu/digest/air-pollution-from-fossil-fuelscosts-8-billion-per-day-new-research-finds. See also Roger Pielke, Every Day 10,000
People Die Due To Air Pollution From Fossil Fuels, FORBES (Mar. 10, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerpielke/2020/03/10/every-day-10000-people-die-dueto-air-pollution-from-fossil-fuels/#447394b52b6a.
10
Report Examines Hidden Health and Env’t. Costs of Energy Prod. and Consumption,
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. (Oct. 19, 2009),
https://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=12794.
11
See Nicholas Z. Muller et al., Environmental Accounting for Pollution in the United
States Economy, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1649, 1665 (2011).
12
Renee Cho, How Climate Change Impacts the Economy, COLUM. UNIV. EARTH INST.:
STATE OF THE PLANET (June 20, 2019), https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2019/06/20/climatechange-economy-impacts/.
13
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW
(Cambridge Univ. Press ed., 2007). “By 2050, models suggest a plausible range of costs
from –2% (net gains) to +5% of GDP, with this range growing towards the end of the
century, because of the uncertainties about the required amount of mitigation, the pace of
technological innovation and the efficiency with which policy is applied across the globe.
Critically, these costs rise sharply as mitigation becomes more ambitious or sudden.” Id.
at 249.
14
Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Change Could Cost the U.S. Economy Hundreds of Billions a
Year by 2090, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS, (Apr. 29, 2019)
https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/04/climate-change-could-cost-u-seconomy-billions/.
15
STERN, supra note 13, at 249.
60
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hope to reduce most of the impact of climate change.16 Hence, the world
faces a tremendous and time-pressured task to create a future that is less
dependent on fossil-fuels.17
B. Nuclear Energy and the Energy Transition
Energy is defined as the ability to do work; it is a prime mover of
civilizations and essential to get anything done.18 Without energy, no
work could be completed, and with unlimited energy the potential for
human civilization should, in theory, be endless.19 Out of all energy
sources that can be harnessed by humans, nuclear energy is the most
efficient.20 A nuclear reaction has around 100 million times more energy
than a chemical reaction,21 making the energy density of nuclear energy
unrivaled in comparison to fossil-fueled energy.
Nuclear energy is both a clean and reliable source of power as
nuclear power plants do not emit harmful emissions.22 It is estimated that
the carbon footprint of nuclear energy is similar to wind and solar
energy.23 Coal-fired power plants, on the other hand, emit both criteria
pollutants toxins and GHG emissions.24 Gas plants are a cleaner source

16

United Nations Env’t Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2019, 1 Doc. DEW/2263/NA
(2019).
17
NAT’L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN.: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, VITAL SIGNS OF
THE PLANET, Is it too late to prevent climate change?, https://climate.nasa.gov/faq/16/isit-too-late-to-prevent-climate-change/ (last visited Sep, 10, 2019). See also Georg Kell,
The Energy Transformation Is Not Happening Fast Enough, FORBES (Sep. 11, 2019),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2019/09/11/the-energy-transformation-is-nothappening-fast-enough/#40b52f4a23da.
18
See VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY 1 (The MIT Press, 2017).
19
See generally FREDERICK COTTRELL, ENERGY AND SOCIETY: THE RELATION BETWEEN
ENERGY, SOCIAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1955).
20
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, Nuclear 101: How Does a Nuclear Reactor Work? (May
19, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclear-101-how-does-nuclear-reactorwork. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, Nuclear Power is the Most Reliable Energy Source
and It’s Not Even Close (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/nuclearpower-most-reliable-energy-source-and-its-not-even-close.
21
SAMUEL GLASSTONE & ALEXANDER SESONSKE, NUCLEAR REACTOR ENGINEERING 143
(Van Norstrand Reinhold Company, 1967).
22
JOEL B. EISEN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT § 7 at 2 (5th ed.
2019); NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., What is Nuclear Energy?,
https://www.nei.org/fundamentals/what-is-nuclear-energy (last visited Mar, 9, 2020).
23
EISEN et al., supra note 22, at 37.
24
Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 68
VAND. L. REV. 141, 158 (2016).
61
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of energy than coal-fired plants but still remain a great contributor to
GHG emissions.25
At the time of writing, nuclear power makes up around 19.7% of US
energy mix.26 There are 96 commercial reactors operating in the US,27
and globally, there are 452 reactors.28 While the US power grid remains
dominated by a fleet of both coal and gas-fired power plants29 there is an
emerging trend of increasing renewable sources.30 However, it remains
unlikely for coal and gas-fired power plants to reach below double digits
in the generation mix anytime soon.31
It has been decades since the US last saw a thriving nuclear industry,
and most plants currently belong to an old era.32 However, the clean
nature of nuclear energy amid the current energy transition could make it
a competitive component in both climate policy and strategy. 33 The
energy markets are incredibly dynamic, subject to constant and
fundamental change, and as history has taught us, predicting the future of
energy markets has proven to be a challenging task.34 However, the
25
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Natural Gas Explained, Natural Gas and the Environment,
https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/natural-gas/natural-gas-and-the-environment.php
(last visited Sep. 23, 2019).
26
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): What is U.S. Electricity
Generation by energy source, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
27
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): How Many Nuclear
Power Plants are in the United States, and Where Are They Located?,
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=207&t=3 (last visited Dec. 30, 2019).
28
INT. ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear, https://www.iea.org/fuels-and-technologies/nuclear
(last visited Feb. 27, 2020).
29
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., What is U.S. Electricity Generation by Energy Source?,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=427&t=3 (last visited
Feb. 27, 2020).
30
Id.
31
EISEN et al., supra note 22, at 284.
32
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, What’s the Lifespan for a Nuclear Reactor? Much
Longer Than You Might Think, https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/whats-lifespannuclear-reactor-much-longer-you-might-think (last visited Apr. 16, 2020).
33
Michael E. Stern and Margaret M. Stern, Does Nuclear Power Have a Future
Symposium: Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV.
431 (2012).
34
For example, considering the recent “Shale Revolution” few to no scholars predicted
that this would give rise to resurgence of American hydrocarbon production. See
generally RUSSELL GOLD, THE BOOM: HOW FRACKING IGNITED THE AMERICAN ENERGY
REVOLUTION AND CHANGED THE WORLD (Simon & Schuster, 2014). Furthermore, in the
1970’s nuclear energy was predicted to become “[t]oo cheap to meter” because of
efficiency levels. Thomas Wellock, “Too Cheap to Meter”: A History of the Phrase
(June 3, 2016), https://public-blog.nrc-gateway.gov/2016/06/03/too-cheap-to-meter-ahistory-of-the-phrase/.
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energy transition and the effort to reduce the dependency of fossil-fuels
has created many exciting opportunities and trends that could, in the
long-run, benefit nuclear energy.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
High costs associated with nuclear power has sidelined nuclear
reactors in the US energy transition as a critical and reliable alternative to
conventional fossil fuels.
Proponents for nuclear reinvigoration have a wide variety of
arguments in support of nuclear energy ranging from climate change to
energy security benefits.35 However, these types of arguments have been
trumped by the unresolved concerns of nuclear proliferation, radioactive
waste disposal concerns, economic costs, and the opinion that the effects
of climate change and energy security are not as imminent to necessitate
investment into nuclear energy.36
Energy products are, in economic terms, perfect substitutes, meaning
that energy sources compete on price and no other features.37 Because of
the different risk perceptions, nuclear energy has higher costs than many
other types of energy sources.38 The nuclear industry has long struggled
to compete with both coal and gas-fired power plants, and today some
estimations even predict that the nuclear industry could be completely
phased out by market forces around the year 2050.39 Similar concerns
have been raised by the industry that without reform, nuclear power
plants will not be economically viable.40 In light of the current state of

35

See INT’L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Climate Change and Nuclear Energy 2016,
(2016), https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/CCANP16web86692468.pdf.
36
Justin Gundlach, What’s the Cost of a New Nuclear Power Plant? The Answer’s
Gonna Cost you: A Risk-Based Approach to Estimating the Cost of New Nuclear Plants,
18 N.Y.U. ENV’T L. J. 600, 601 (2011).
37
Gokul Iyer et. al, Implications of Small Modular Reactors for Climate Change
Mitigation, ENERGY ECONOMICS, 45, 146 (2014); see also Matthias Kahlkul et al.,
Learning or lock-in: Optimal Technology Policies to Support Mitigation, RESOURCE &
ENERGY ECONOMICS, 34, 34-57 (2012).
38
The Levelized Cost of Energy (LCOE) holds nuclear energy as very expansive in
comparison to other energy sources. See Lazard, Lazard’s Levelized Cost of Energy
Analysis, Version 13.0 (2019), https://www.lazard.com/perspective/lcoe2019/.
39
See generally Peter A. Bradford, How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing,
BULLETIN OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (2013).
40
NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. [NEI], NEI to Wall Street Analysts: Power Market Flaws Must
Be Corrected, ‘Significant Movement’ Underway to Better Monetize Value of Nuclear
Power Plants (Feb. 12, 2015, 8:33 AM), https://www.globenewswire.com/news63
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the nuclear industry, the possibility of a second nuclear renaissance looks
bleak. Nevertheless, the low emission basis of nuclear energy, in
conjunction with a scientific consensus on the realities of climate change,
has sparked industry attention to the clean capabilities of nuclear
reactors.41 Some commentators go even further, arguing that without
nuclear energy, mitigation of climate change is not possible.42
The nuclear industry has struggled when relying on political support.
The current gridlock in Congress makes the prospect of federal support
for nuclear energy unlikely, and as of this writing, federal
administrations have shown minimal interest in promoting nuclear
energy, based on potential climate benefits.43 Climate change legislation
that would benefit nuclear energy has also proven to be very difficult to
pass through the political process.44
However, there has been some recent political developments that
could benefit nuclear energy. The Nuclear Energy Innovation
Capabilities Act (“NEICA”) was recently signed by President Trump as
an effort to promote efficiency in the licensing and regulatory process of
nuclear power in the United States.45 Furthermore, the Senate Energy and
Natural Resource Committee recently approved a key piece of legislation
for the development of advanced nuclear reactors in the US.46 Another
exciting development has been the first EU-US High-Level Industry

release/2015/02/12/705928/10119964/en/NEI-to-Wall-Street-Analysts-Power-MarketFlaws-Must-Be-Corrected.html/.
41
RAYMOND L. MURRAY, NUCLEAR ENERGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPTS,
SYSTEMS, AND APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR PROCESSES 481–82 (6th ed. 2009).
42
CNN, Top climate change scientists’ letter to policy influencers (Nov. 3, 2013, 8:12
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2013/11/03/world/nuclear-energy-climate-change-scientistsletter/index.html/. The International Energy Agency (IEA) stated that it would be next to
impossible to fulfill the global commitments to the United Nations Paris Agreement, in
the Energy Outlook 2019, “double globally within 20 years to meet the two-degree
Celsius Climate Target.” Rudiger Tscherning, Ablawg.ca, Small Modular (Nuclear)
Reactors in Canada – Small Steps Towards Realization (Dec. 3, 2019),
https://ablawg.ca/2019/12/03/small-modular-nuclear-reactors-in-canada-small-stepstowards-realization/.
43
EISEN, supra note 22, at 422–23.
44
“Opposition from Republicans and coal-state Democrats has left the prospect of
climate change legislation bleak in subsequent congresses.” Id. at 321.
45
World Nuclear News [WNN], US nuclear innovation act becomes law (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/US-nuclear-innovation-act-becomes-law/.
46
TSCHERNING, supra note 42; See also U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy & Natural
Resources, Murkowski, Booker, and 13 Colleagues Reintroduce the Nuclear Energy
Leadership Act, REPUBLICAN NEWS (May 27, 2019),
https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/3/murkowski-booker-and-13colleagues-reintroduce/.
64
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Meeting on the Development of Small Modular Reactors (“SMRs”).47
Many factors, such as energy security, international polity, and
economics, are a driving force behind these legislative and political
initiatives.48 However, whether or not these political actions are
sufficient to assist the nuclear industry remains to be seen.
Local climate initiatives have proven to be very effective and could
potentially benefit nuclear energy. States and local utilities play a crucial
role in overseeing the implementation of climate change resolutions and
promoting low-carbon energy solutions.49 For example, The New York
Independent Systems Operator (“NYISO”) has considered implementing
a carbon price into its operation of the wholesale electricity market.50
Similarly, in California and other states, comparable initiatives have been
implemented.51 Thus, local climate action could potentially benefit
nuclear energy as a clean source of reliable energy.
One of nuclear energy’s core problem is that it is burdened with a
unique set of issues that encumbers the prospect of development and
deployment of new reactors.52 Also, since the issue of radioactive waste
disposal has not yet been satisfactorily resolved in the US
environmentally, many challenges to nuclear energy development
remain.53 Furthermore, nuclear energy projects are fraught with
litigation constraints under the National Environmental Protection Act
(“NEPA”), procedural challenges, and general environmental litigation.54
47

European Comm., EU-U.S. high-level forum on small modular reactors (Oct. 21,
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/info/events/eu-us-high-level-forum-small-modular-reactorssmr-2019-oct-21_en/.
48
See Richard Rhodes & Denis Beller, The Need for Nuclear Power, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Vol. 79, No. 1, 30-44 (Jan – Feb. 2000).
49
EISEN, supra note 22, at 343-351.
50
Sue Tierney & Paul Hibbard, Potential New Carbon Pricing in the NYISO Market,
Analysis Group’s Final Report, NEW YORK INDEPENDENT SYSTEMS OPERATOR [NYISO]
(Oct. 3, 2019),
https://www.nyiso.com/documents/20142/8524371/2%20Potential%20New%20Carbon%
20Pricing%20in%20the%20NYISO%20Market.pdf/e257e203-26b1-f316-fa04c4d246fb3d1c/.
51
Many states and local governments have implemented initiatives to promote renewable
energy and reduce carbon emissions. EISEN, supra note 22, at 819; Felix Mormann,
Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 681, 694 n. 85
(2012). Many states further have so-called renewable portfolio standards (RPS). See
EISEN, supra note 22, at 819 (for an overview of local initiatives).
52
HELEN COOK, THE LAW OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 305 (2013).
53
The YUCCA Mountain controversy has led to difficulty in acquiring long-term waste
facilities in the United States. For a good overview of contemporary litigation concerning
waste-disposal of radioactive waste. See In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
54
EISEN, supra note 22, at 438.
65
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There have also been concerns that nuclear energy has a difficult time
competing with other forms of renewable energy that receive federal and
state support through subsidies.55 Renewable energy producers have
long benefited from a production tax credit. This tax credit does not
benefit the nuclear industry since it requires actual production of
energy.56
Other market conditions such as the abundant supply of natural gas
in the United States as a result of the recent shale-fracking “revolution”
has led many nuclear power providers to cancel future plants due to longterm risk perspectives and competition concerns.57 A plentiful supply of
natural gas in combination with the onset of retail customer choice
makes it very difficult for the nuclear industry to compete with cheap
natural gas from Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (“CCGT”) power
plants.58 However, as will be discussed below, the energy transition and
other climate-related factors could assist nuclear energy to become a
competitive energy source.
A.

Internalization of Climate Costs and Negative Externalities

Both the history and the public perception of nuclear power plants
have forced the industry to internalize most of the negative externalities
of production.59 This can be compared to the fossil-fuel industry, which
has borne few to none of the social costs from its production and energy
generation.60 The substantial investment risk embedded in nuclear
energy projects has created hesitation from investors to finance.61
If both coal and gas-fired power plants are forced to internalize some
of the climate-related and social costs caused by the combustion of fossil
fuels, this will make carbon-based energy more expensive.62 So far, few
55

Repka, infra note 62, at 10251.
Bradford, supra note 39, at 16.
57
Id. at 2.
58
Id.
59
Hammond, supra note 24, at 25 (providing details and comparisons to other fuels).
60
Matthew L. Wald, Fossil Fuels’ Hidden Costs Is in Billions Study Says, N.Y. TIMES,
(Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/science/earth/20fossil.html/. See
generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, HIDDEN COSTS OF ENERGY (National Academic
Press, 2010).
61
EISEN, supra note 22, at 452 (“Perceptions about nuclear power relate to its financial
viability as well as to its political feasibility. Plagued by the experience of cost overruns
and regulatory and litigation-related delays during the construction phase in the 1980s
and early 1990s, investors have been hesitant to back new nuclear construction”).
62
See MIT, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER, AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT STUDY (2009)
(study showing that a price on carbon and internalization of social costs from fossil-fuel
combustion could make nuclear energy more competitive again). See also David A.
56

66

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2020

11

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

initiatives have been successful in attempting to push the cost of climate
change upon the fossil-fuels industry, and the prospect of federal climate
change regulation seems unlikely in the near future.63
A higher price tag on carbon would not only drastically increase the
cost-competitiveness of nuclear energy but could also spark a renewed
interest in the research and development of nuclear energy.64 In the
European Union (“EU”), pricing carbon emissions has helped spur
nuclear reinvigoration.65 Many ideas to price carbon emissions have been
put forward, such as a carbon-tax or the direct pricing of emissions, but
none have gained any traction to have a sufficient impact on climate
change.66 One interesting idea is mandatory carbon capture and
sequestration (“CCS”)67 technologies that could drastically increase the
cost of fossil-fueled power plants.68 However, CCS technology has not
yet been proven to be cost-effective enough to enable regulators to
enforce the use of such technology.69 CCS technology is an essential tool
against climate change and has been recognized by the IPCC as a vital
component to mitigate the effects of climate change.70
Nuclear energy does not create the large amount of emissions that
gas-fired power plants do without CCS technology, and to compete
effectively, the costs of emissions must be internalized by the gas-fired
Repka & Tyson R. Smith, Deep Decarbonization and Nuclear Energy, 48 ELR 10244,
10256 (2018) (discussing the benefit of carbon-pricing for the nuclear energy industry).
63
Coral Davenport & Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on
Climate Science, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.html (claiming
Trump administration has provided little effort to increase climate change legislation).
64
Repka, supra note 62, at 10252.
65
MATTI KOJO & TAPIO LITMANEN, INTRODUCTION IN THE RENEWAL OF NUCLEAR POWER
IN FINLAND 25–26 (Matti Kojo & Tapio Litmanen eds., 6th ed. 2009).
66
For a good overview of carbon pricing See Narassimhan, et al., Carbon pricing in
practice: a review of existing emissions trading systems, 18 J. CLIMATE POL’Y 967 (April
17, 2018).
67
See STEPHEN A. RACKLEY, CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE (Elsevier Butterworth
Heinemann, 2nd ed. 2017).
68
Arnold W. Reitze Jr., Electric Power in a Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 821, 855 (2010).
69
This is based on the fact that CCS technology remains too expensive to become
competitive on the electrical grid. However, estimates show that advanced nuclear energy
can be cost-competitive with baseload technologies, when assuming life-span, and social
costs is reflected in the cost of generating electricity. Int’l Energy Agency & Nuclear
Energy Agency, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity 14 fig. ES.1 (2015 ed.).
70
GLOBAL CCS INSTITUTE, Carbon capture and storage remains essential to beating
climate change (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.globalccsinstitute.com/news-media/pressroom/media-releases/carbon-capture-and-storage-remains-essential-to-beating-climatechange/.
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power plant providers.71 If the cost of this type of harm is internalized by
the fossil fuels industry, alongside other non-climate related costs of
combustion, then nuclear energy would become a more competitive
source of energy.
B.

Nuclear Energy and the Baseload Rubric

If the energy transition, from fossil-based fuels to clean sources of
energy could result in a phase-out of both coal and gas-fired power
plants, there is a real risk of the power grid becoming unreliable.72 Most
power grids in the United States follow a baseload rubric.73 Baseload
power is “the minimum amount of electric power delivered or required
over a given period of time at a steady rate.”74 Due to the around the
clock reliability of coal, gas, and nuclear energy these sources make up a
large portion of baseload generation in the United States. In a nuclear
power plant, the fission chain reaction is difficult to start and stop, and
for economic reasons, the marginal cost of nuclear power is meager,
making it a great candidate as a baseload provider.75
Some generous energy models support the idea of an electrical grid
consisting of renewable energy in conjunction with battery storage
capabilities.76 However, the baseload rubric is entrenched into existing
“patterns of consumption, investment, and regulation,”77 and as such is
unlikely to be replaced. Thus, nuclear energy is important to ensure
reliability on the energy grid, in particular in a time of growing
renewable energy generation. 78 Proponents of renewable energy argue
that battery technology can resolve the issues of intermittency. However,
apart from a few optimistic energy models, the baseload rubric is

71

See generally MIT, supra note 62; see also Repka, supra note 62.
EISEN, supra note 22, at 423.
73
EIA, Electricity Explained, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/electricity/electricityin-the-us-generation-capacity-and-sales.php (last visited Aug. 31, 2020).
74
EIA, Glossary, https://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.php?id=B (last visited Jan. 2,
2020).
75
EISEN, supra note 22, at 415.
76
Neanda Salvaterra, Giant Batteries Supercharge Wind and Solar Plans, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/giant-batteries-supercharge-wind-andsolar-plans-11565535601.
77
Gundlach, supra note 36 at 613.
78
EISEN, supra note 22, at 415-416.
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unlikely to change.79 Instead, it seems more likely that renewable
energy´s place is to provide peak load demand.80
Nuclear power plants are the cleanest source of reliable baseload
generation available.81 However, nuclear energy could be a key
component in assisting a clean future by providing baseload power where
the constraints of intermittency caused by a more renewable energybased grid.82
II.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

The future of nuclear energy in the United States depends on the
ability of the nuclear industry and policymakers to overcome the public
perception of nuclear energy as harmful and dangerous.83 A dark history
and recurring accidents assisted in shaping a negative public perception
of nuclear energy that goes back to the discovery of nuclear energy’s
remarkable potential. Nuclear energy was born out of the wrath of war,
and the discovery of its energy potential was only realized after mass
destruction.84 As a result, deep-rooted fear and cultural opposition to
nuclear energy developed and remains deeply entrenched in modern
society.85

79

See Jacobson et al., 100% Clean and Renewable Wind, Water, and Sunlight All-Sector
Energy Roadmaps for 139 Countries of the World, JOULE (2017). Note: Jacobson, et al.
have received critique based on specific assumptions made in their roadmap. Robert
Fares, Landmark 100 Percent Renewable Energy Study Flawed, Say 21 Leading Experts
(June 23 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/landmark-100-percentrenewable-energy-study-flawed-say-21-leading-experts/.
80
See Gundlach, supra note 36, at 612.
81
Id at 603.
82
“Despite many concerns about nuclear power, it fills a critical need for electricity
reliability by providing steady baseload power, comprising 20 percent of US electricity
generation. Its lifecycle carbon emissions are comparable to hydro and wind power,
making it an essential player in climate change policy.” Emily Hammond, Nuclear
Power, Risk, and Retroactivity, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1059, 1063 (2015).
83
Wouter Poortinga & Nick F. Pidgeon, Trust, the asymmetry principle, and the role of
prior beliefs. 24 RISK ANALYSIS 1475, 1475–86; Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk and the
Future of Nuclear Power, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L AND COMP. L. 191, 191–98 (1992); Paul
Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675, 675—682 (1993).
84
“[N]uclear energy was conceived in secrecy, born in war, and first revealed to the
world in horror. No matter how much proponents try to separate the peaceful from the
weapons atom, the connection is firmly embedded in the minds of the public.” K.R.
Smith, Perception of Risks Associated with Nuclear Power, 4 ENERGY ENV’T MONITOR 1,
61–62 (1988).
85
See Spencer R. Weart & Allan M. Winkler, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images, 42
PHYSICS TODAY 7, 70 (1988).
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The question of nuclear energy’s future is a complex and often
morally complicated issue rather than a consideration and evaluation of
technological possibilities.86 Given the existence of widespread distrust
in nuclear technology, these objections cannot be dismissed in favor of
technocratic arguments.87 It has been difficult to resolve disagreements
around nuclear energy by relying on empirical evidence.88 The argument
that there have been few accidents and catastrophic events involving
nuclear power plants has not gained any traction.89 Neither has the
argument that reactor safety and advancement of technological features
make past accidents extremely unlikely.90 The complexity of nuclear
energy has afforded it a special place within the perception literature;
these unique traits make it a challenging and complex energy source to
manage socially as well as politically.91
A.

A Brief Overview of Nuclear Power Plant Accidents

The first major accident involving a nuclear power plant was the
Three Mile Island (“TMI”) accident, which occurred as a result of human
error related to the plant’s safety analysis.92 There were no deaths
directly related to the accident, and, there were few or even zero latent
cancer effects as a result of the aftermath of TMI.93 However, the cost to
society from increased regulation resulting in reduced operations from
other reactors was enormous.94
The second major accident involving a nuclear power plant was the
1986 meltdown of the Chernobyl reactor. This accident was a result of
the subordination of public health and safety within a militaristic system
leading to an unsafe reactor.95 In comparison to the TMI accident,
86

Ralph Berger, 11 Reader NE 161 Nuclear Power Engineering 334, 334–56 (2011).
See David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 99-100 (2000).
88
“Beliefs about the catastrophic nature of nuclear power are a major determinant of
public opposition to that technology. That is not a comforting conclusion because the
rarity of catastrophic events makes it extremely difficult to resolve disagreements by
recourse to empirical evidence.” Slovic et al., Facts and Fears: Understanding Perceived
Risk, in The Perception of Risk 137, 150–51 (2000).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Slovic, supra note 88, at 192.
92
For a good overview of the accident itself see J. Samuel Walker, Three Mile Island: A
Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective, 69(3) BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 63
(2004). See also In re TMI Litigation, 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999).
93
EISEN, supra note 22, at 428.
94
Id.
95
Smith, supra note 84, at 3.
87
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Chernobyl had much more significant effects on human health and the
environment by sending waves of radiation into neighboring countries.96
However, it is essential to note that the reactor type used at Chernobyl
could, by default, not be sited in the United States.97 The effects of the
Chernobyl accident were global, and the aftermath involved significant
social, political, and economic issues.98 Many of the health-related
effects of Chernobyl, similar to the TMI accident, were lower than
initially expected.99
The last major nuclear power plant accident to occur was the 2011
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (“Fukushima”) disaster
resulting in stigmatization, and once again, world-wide repercussions for
the nuclear industry.100 After the accident, opposition to nuclear energy
found new breeding ground, leading to some nations curtailing their
nuclear power generation fleet.101 However, considering similar risks to
the US nuclear fleet, regulators found that the continuance of operations
would not “pose an imminent risk to public health and safety.”102 It
should be noted that all of these accidents involved reactors that were
constructed in the 1970s, and that the advancement of reactor technology
has been significant since.103
Another factor that affects the public perception of nuclear energy is
the lack of safe storage for nuclear waste in the United States.104 Studies
show that radioactive waste is a significant cause of social and political
distrust in nuclear technology.105 The lack of a national facility that can
handle radioactive waste is a hamper to the development of nuclear

96

See E. Cardis & M. Hatch, The Chernobyl accident – an epidemiological perspective,
23 CLIN ONCOL (R COLL RADIOL) 251, 253 (2011).
97
Smith, supra note 84, at 3. One author has described the Reaktor Bolshoy Moshchnosti
Kanalnyy (“RBMK”) as a “monument to the folly of placing political ideology before
public health and safety.” Chernobyl Accident and its Consequences, NUCLEAR ENERGY
INST. (May 2019), https://nei.org/resources/fact-sheets/chernobyl-accident-and-itsconsequences(last visited June 22, 2020).
98
Id.
99
EISEN, supra note 22, at 430.
100
Iyer et al., supra note 37, at 146.
101
See Lincoln L. Davies, Beyond Fukushima: Disasters, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1937, 1937–38 (2011).
102
See DR. CHARLES MILLER ET AL., U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N , RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ENHANCING REACTOR SAFETY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEART-TERM TASK FORCE
REVIEW OF INSIGHTS FROM THE FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT vii (2011); see also,
Hammond, supra note 82, at 1065.
103
EISEN, supra note 22, at 421.
104
Id. at 416.
105
Paul Slovic et al., Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste, 254 SCI.
1603–1607 (1991).
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technology, and yet another factor limiting the development of reactor
technology in the United States.106
B.

Public Perception and Nuclear Energy

Unfortunately, events like TMI, Chernobyl, and Fukushima reinforce
the entrenchment of negative notions associated with nuclear
technology.107 Public perception of risk can halt nuclear energy
growth.108 Even if nuclear energy has a proven safety record, humanbeings are far from rational economic actors.109 After TMI and
Chernobyl, public opinion of nuclear energy saw a drastic shift.110 After
Fukushima, these fears were once again exacerbated,111 causing Germany
to initiate a phase-out of its entire commercial reactor fleet.112
These past accidents have led to an amplified process of risk
assessment, creating a difficult hurdle for the industry to develop and
advance new reactor technology.113 For example, investment costs for
current commercial reactors have increased as a result of greater
perception of risk.114 Following these accidents safety requirements have
been enhanced, thereby increasing construction periods and costs for the
nuclear industry.115

106

Repka, supra note 62, at 10263.
Slovic, supra note 83, at 190.
108
Iyer et al., supra note 37, at 146.
109
Hammond, supra note 82, at 1065.
110
See generally, Toby Bolsen & Fay Lomax Cook, The Polls—Trends: Public Opinion
on Energy Policy: 1974-2006, 72 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 364 (2008); Nathan
Hultman & Jonathan Koomey, Three Mile Island: The Driver of US nuclear power’s
decline?, 69 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 63 (2013).
111
See generally, MIT CENTER FOR ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY RESEARCH,
THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER AFTER FUKUSHIMA. MIT CTR. FOR ENERGY AND ENVTL.
POL’Y RES. (2012); see also, Ioannis N. Kessides, The Future of the Nuclear Industry
Reconsidered: Risks, Uncertainties, and Continued Promise, 48 ENERGY POL’Y 185
(2012).
112
Iyer, infra note 131, at 5.
113
EISEN, supra note 22, at 416.
114
See generally M.V. Ramana, Nuclear Power: Economic, Safety, Health, and
Environmental Issues of Near-Term Technologies, 34 ANN. REV. OF ENV’T AND
RESOURCES 127 (2009).
115
See generally, Pedro Carajilescov et al., Construction time of PWRs, 55 ENERGY
POL’Y5 31(2013); see also Jonathan Koomey & Nathan E. Hultman, A reactor-level
analysis of busbar costs for US nuclear plants, 1970-2005 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5630
(2007).
107
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Nevertheless, on a per KWh basis, nuclear energy is the least
dangerous out of all energy sources,116 with no deaths directly associated
with generating power from nuclear energy.117 It is also imperative to
note that current nuclear facilities undergoing construction and regulation
are much safer in comparison to coal and gas-fired power plants.118 One
study found that the likelihood of a severe accident at a nuclear power
plant resulting in five or more deaths is approximately a millionth that of
the safest hydrocarbon-based energy source.119 Furthermore, some of the
new generation reactors can even be waste and proliferation-resistant.120
This means that certain new types of reactors can utilize existing waste,
and the reactor itself cannot be used to produce weapons-grade uranium.
In effect, this new technology would alleviate existing security concerns
surrounding the production of energy from nuclear processes.121 Apart
from power plants, nuclear reactor technology has been applied in many
different areas from submarines, icebreakers, aircraft carriers, and space
technology.122
The nuclear industry must distill both public trust and confidence in
the nuclear process.123 As the industry tries to regain public trust,
hopefully new reactor technology can assist in the re-emergence of a
fruitful nuclear industry. Furthermore, time will tell whether advanced
reactor technology can overcome the negative public perceptions that
haunt the industry.

116

James Conca, How Deadly Is Your Kilowatt? We Rank The Killer Energy Sources,
FORBES (June 10, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/06/10/energysdeathprint-a-price-always-paid/#39997629709b.
117
Hannah Ritchie, What Are the Safest Sources of Energy? (Feb 10, 2020),
https://ourworldindata.org/safest-sources-ofenergy#:~:text=Nuclear%20energy%20is%20by%20far,38%20times%20fewer%20than
%20gas.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
TerraPower’s generation IV traveling wave reactor (“TWR”) is also designed to
eliminate the possibility of certain severe accidents; it uses depleted uranium for fuel and
has features that render it proliferation-resistant. Repka, supra note 62, at 10247.
121
Iyer et al., supra note 37, at 7; see also Son H. Kim & Jae Edmonds, THE JOINT
GLOBAL CHANGE RES. INST., THE CHALLENGES AND POTENTIAL OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FOR
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE (2007).
122
Tscherning, supra note 46.
123
See generally, Alvin M. Weinberg, The Maturity and Future of Nuclear Energy, 64
AM. SCIENTIST 16 (1976).
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III.

THE ISSUES OF CUSTOM-MADE CONVENTIONAL LARGE
REACTOR FACILITIES

Commercial nuclear facilities operating in the United States are
large, complex, and often custom-made.124 Guided by the principle of
economies of scale, the nuclear industry has continued to invest and
focus on building large reactors and power plants.125 Large power plants
have a unique construction fitted to a specific location. Because of size
and licensing constraints, these projects are incredibly costly and timeconsuming.126 It can take several decades to construct a conventional
nuclear power plant in the United States today.127 Arguably, many of the
issues plaguing the development of nuclear energy relate to the lack of
standardization and design efficiency within the current reactor fleet.
Most of the current commercial reactor fleet operating in the United
States were built in the 1970s, with many having been subject to severe
licensing and cost constraints.128 For example, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (“TVA”) Watts Bar 1 reactor came into effect in 1996 but was
ordered in 1970.129 The latest reactor to come online in the United States
was the Watts Bar 2.130 Moreover, as recently witnessed by the 2016
Westinghouse bankruptcy, the conventional nuclear power plant
continues to face many problems. 131 The economics of the conventional
124

“The plants in the 1970s and 80s were custom plants, designed and constructed in a
post-three mile island regulatory environment of significant change. Interest rates were
high, and there usually was no allowance for recovery of capital costs until commercial
operation" Repka, supra note 62, at 10260.
125
See, B. Mignacca & G. Locatelli, Economics and finance of Small Modular Reactors:
A systematic review and research agenda, 118 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
REV. 1, 5 (2019).
126
Erik Slobe, The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Next Steps in Encouraging
Innovations in Nuclear Energy, 80 UNIV. OF PITT. L. REV. 753, 754 (2019).
127
See Christopher Groskopf, The United States’ Newest Nuclear Power Plant has Taken
43 Years to Build, QUARTZ (May 11, 2016), https://qz.com/681753/the-united-statesnewest-nuclear-power-plant-has-taken-43-years-to-build/.
128
EISEN, supra note 22, at 421.
129
Id.
130
Staff Report, Watts Bar power ascension tests completed, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE
PRESS, (Oct. 3, 2016),
https://www.timesfreepress.com/news/business/aroundregion/story/2016/oct/03/wattsbar-power-ascension-tests-completed/389869/.
131
James Conca, Westinghouse Bankruptcy Shakes The Nuclear World, FORBES, (MAR.
31, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2017/03/31/westinghousebankruptcy-shakes-the-nuclear-world/#1deb5e102688; See also Anthony Michael Sabino
& Michael J. Abatemarco, Westinghouse Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: National Security Also
an Issue, 33 NATURAL GAS & ELECTRICITY 8 (2017). Other countries have also faced
major difficulties with licensing constraints and cost-overruns affecting the nuclear
industry. See Inkeri Ruuska et al., A New Governance Approach for Multi-firm Projects:
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nuclear power plants began to falter in the 1970s, even before the TMI
accident.132 At the time, this was contrary to public belief, as it was a
general thought that the efficiency of nuclear energy would lead to
almost free energy in the future. 133 Instead, the price of nuclear energy
has increased drastically since.134
The large conventional power plant is associated with the negative
public perception of nuclear energy. All of the significant and wellknown accidents have involved LR facilities, creating a deep distrust for
this type of nuclear technology. The focus on LR’s by the nuclear
industry should be re-thought as the nuclear businesses and politicians
try to regain public trust and acceptance of nuclear technology.
A.

Small Modular Reactors

The future of nuclear energy would greatly benefit from the
deployment of Small Modular Reactors (“SMRs”).135 Compared to large
reactor facilities, SMRs can be produced in a factory setting, and rid
many of the hidden costs carried by the current reactor fleet.136 For their
novelty and potential, SMRs have been praised by both industry,
government, and academia for their potential benefits.137 Over one billion
of private capital has already been invested in advanced reactor
technology.138 Yet, no “truly modular” SMR has been built so far.139 The
Office of Nuclear Energy has recognized the benefits of SMRs as part of
its strategy for the future development of clean, safe, and affordable
nuclear energy.140
Lessons from Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3 Nuclear Power Plant Projects, 29
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT 64, (2011), and Inkeri Ruuska et al.,
Dimensions of Distance in a Project Network: Exploring Olkiluoto 3 Nuclear Power
Plant Project, 27 INT’L J. OF PROJECT MGMT. 142, (2009).
132
EISEN, supra note 22, at 421.
133
See generally WELLOCK, supra note 35.
134
LAZARD, supra note 7.
135
Advances in Small Modular Reactor Technology Developments, IAEA 1 (2018).
IAEA definition: “newer generation reactors designed to generate electric power up to
300MW, whose components and systems can be shop fabricated and then transported as
modules to sites for installation as demand arises.”
136
Id. at forward.
137
See Iyer et al., supra note 37, at 144; Tristano Sainati et al., Small Modular Reactors:
Licensing Constraints and the Way Forward, 82 ENERGY 1092, 1094 (2015).
138
Samuel Brinton, The Advanced Nuclear Industry, THIRD WAY (June 15, 2015),
https://www.thirdway.org/report/the-advanced-nuclear-industry.
139
MIGNACCA, supra note 125, at 12.
140
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, ADVANCED SMALL MODULAR REACTIONS (SMRS),
https://www.energy.gov/ne/nuclear-reactor-technologies/small-modular-nuclear-reactors.
75

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss1/3

20

Stenberg: Energy Transitions and the Future of Nuclear Energy: A Case for S
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

SMRs are defined as reactors with a generation capacity of less than
300 MWe,141 a small size reactor in comparison to the conventional
commercial reactors operating in the United States.142 There are many
different types of SMRs, and advanced reactors currently under
development,143 designed for a multitude of different purposes and
applications.144 Most designs are based on the widely proven Light
Water Reactor (“LWR”), including Pressurized Water Technology
(“PWR”), and Boiling Water Reactor (“BWR”).145 Others are advanced
reactor designs, including gas-cooled, and cooled by liquid metal or
salt.146 Some of these reactors belong to the so-called fourth generation
of reactors.147 Nevertheless, since most of the licensing process in the
United States have involved reactors of LWR or PWR, it is unlikely that
the first wave of SMRs will be different.148
1. The benefits of small modular reactors
A revolutionizing benefit of SMRs is their modularity, meaning the
ability to construct these reactors or parts of the reactors in a controlled
factory setting and then install, module by module, at the desired
location.149 The smaller size of SMRs enables them to be transported by
both trucks and railroads, which significantly improves construction
efficiency.150 The ability to produce nuclear reactors in a factory is a
141
See Small Nuclear Power Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION (Nov. 2019),
https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/nuclear-powerreactors/small-nuclear-power-reactors.aspx .
142
US Operating Nuclear Reactors, WORLD NUCLEAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-t-z/appendices/nuclear-powerin-the-usa-appendix-1-us-operating-n.aspx.
143
For a good overview and summary, see Small Modular Reactors, IAEA,
https://www.iaea.org/topics/small-modular-reactors, (Jan. 2, 2020).
144
MIGNACCA, supra note 125, at 1; and, Giorgio Locatelli et al., Generation IV Nuclear
Reactors: Current Status and Future Prospects, 61 ENERGY POLICY 1503, 1503–
10(2013).
145
See WNA, supra note 147.
146
Jasmina Vujić et al., Small Modular Reactors: Simpler, Safer, Cheaper?, 45
ENERGY 288, 290, 292, 295 (2012); see also LOCATELLI, supra note 144.
147
Id. at 288.
148
U.S. NRC, BACKGROUNDER ON NEW NUCLEAR PLANT DESIGNS, (2020).
149
See WNA, supra note 90; See also, OFFICE OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, BENEFITS OF SMALL
MODULAR REACTORS (SMRS) (The term “modular” in the context of SMRs, refers to the
ability to fabricate major components of the nuclear steam supply system in a factory
environment and ship to the point of use)…”) [hereinafter Benefits].
150
Benito Mignacca, Ahmad Hasan Alawneh, & Giorgio Locatelli, Transportation of
Small Modular Reactor Modules: What do the Experts Say?, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS, May
2019, at 1–2.
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great advantage economically,151 that could also generate significant
learning benefits for the nuclear industry.152 Modularization can also
assist the standardization efforts of nuclear design.153
Many SMR designs offer safety and passive security systems,
making these reactors suitable to provide reliable off-grid power to
smaller communities without prior experience of nuclear construction
and generation.154 SMRs could also be used in remote locations of
commercial activity requiring a lot of energy, such as mining and fossil
fuel extraction.155
SMR technology is scalable and, in contrast to LRs, load following
rather than functioning only as a baseload provider.156 This is an essential
aspect of SMRs as these reactors can be constructed as a multi-module
large capacity power plant,157 and also scaled to meet different kinds of
energy demands.158 The load following and co-generation aspect of
SMRs is revolutionizing as the nuclear industry has today been restricted
by providing generation compatible with LRs.159
The benefits of SMRs are abundant, including better design features,
shorter construction times,160 and lesser siting costs.161 Any economic
loss by the smaller reactor size not being able to utilize economies of
scale can be made up of benefits of modularity,162 economies of
151

MIGNACCA supra note 125, at 5-6; WNA, supra note 90, at 6. It has been estimated
that with the doubling of cumulative output, construction costs could decrease of up to
70-90%. LOCATELLI, supra note 144.
152
See M.D. Carelli, et al., Economic Features of Integral, Modular, Small-to-medium
Size Reactors, 52 PROG. NUCL. ENERGY 403, (2010).
153
LOCATELLI, supra note 144, at 1.
154
Id. at 7.
155
Id.
156
See Giorgio Locatelli, et al., Cogeneration: an Option to Facilitate Load Following in
Small Modular Reactors, 97 PROG. NUCL. ENERGY 153, 154–155 (2017). Also,
conventional large reactors can suffer damages from the cost of having to ramp up and
down their load capacity. See EISEN, supra note 22, at 767 n.5.
157
VUJIĆ et al., supra note 150, at 1. “SMRs offer simpler, standardized, and safer
modular design by being factory-built, requiring smaller initial capital investment, and
having shorter construction times. The SMRs could be small enough to be transportable,
could be used in isolated locations without advanced infrastructure and power grid, or
could be clustered in a single site to provide a multi-module, large capacity power plant”.
158
ONE, supra note 149.
159
Locatelli, et al., Load Following by Cogeneration: Options for Small Modular Reactors,
gen IV Reactor and Traditional Large Plants. In 25th international conference on nuclear
engineering. Shanghai, China: ICONE 25; 2017; see also Locatelli, et al., Load following
with Small Modular Reactors (SMR): A real options analysis, 80 ENERGY 41, 41–42(2014).
160
See Sainati, supra note 137, at 1093.
161
See WNA, supra note 141, at 2.
162
See Iyer et al., supra note 37, at 145.
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multiples,163 co-siting economies,164 and scalability.165 Overall, it is
likely that SMRs will face a lower financial risk than large reactors.166
The attractiveness of SMRs as an investment is mostly based on the
principle of modular deployment.167 Undoubtedly, SMRs will face
unique problems by nature,168 but there is much exciting financial
opportunity for investors who are interested in financing SMRs in
comparison to large reactors.169 Many of the benefits inherent in SMR
deployment are in direct response to the faults of the large conventional
reactors currently operating.170 Furthermore, because of the perceived
risk of conventional nuclear facilities, insurance premiums have been
extraordinarily high for specific projects.171 If SMRs are not perceived to
be on the same risk level, then insurance costs could drastically be
reduced. These qualities suggest that SMRs could overcome some of the
barriers traditionally faced by the nuclear industry in utilizing principles
of project finance.172

163
Locatelli & Mancini, A Framework for the Selection of the Right Nuclear Power
Plant., 50 INT J. PROD. RES. 474, 4753–4766 (2012); see also, Boarin et al., Financial
Case Studies on Small – and Medium-size Modular Reactors, 178 NUCLEAR TECH. 218,
218 –232 (2012); see also Boarin et al., Economics and Financing of Small Modular
Reactors (SMRs), in HANDBOOK OF SMALL MODULAR NUCLEAR REACTORS 239-–277
(M.D. Carelli and D.T. Ingersoll, Elsevier eds.) (2015); See also Trianni, et al.,
Competitiveness of Small-medium Reactors: A Probabilistic Study on the Economy of
Scale Factor, in INT’L CONG. ON ADVANCES IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (2009) in
Proceedings of Int’l. Conf. of Nuclear Power Plants 2009.
164
Mignacca, supra note 125, at 1.
165
Sainati, supra note 137, at 1093.
166
Iyer et al., supra note 37, at 147.
167
Carelli et al., Economic Features of Integral, Modular, Small-to-medium Size
Reactors, 52 PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 403, 403–414 (2010). See also Locatelli, et
al., Small Modular Reactors: A Comprehensive Overview of their Economics and
Strategic Aspects, 73 PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ENERGY 75, 75– 83 (2014).
168
For example, there have been very few studies on decommissioning. See Mignacca,
supra note 125.
169
Mignacca, supra note 125, at 3.
170
“Overall we can point out the following advantages of SMRs: (1) Power generating
systems for areas difficult to access or without infrastructure for transportation or fuel:
(2), Modular concept that reduced the amount of work on-site, makes it simpler and faster
to construct; (3) Long-life cycle and reduced need for refueling (perhaps every 10-15
years); (4) Design simplicity; (5) Passive safety; (6) Expanded potential siting options
since more sites are suitable for SMRs; (7) Smaller nuclear island and footprint of the
whole nuclear power plant; (8) Low operation and maintenance costs; (8) Low operation
and maintenance costs; (9) Lower initial costs and risks; and (10) Proliferation
resistance.” Vujic et al., supra note 146, at 289.
171
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BACKGROUNDER ON NUCLEAR INSURANCE AND DISASTER
RELIEF, (2019).
172
Repka, supra note 62, at 10257.
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Other benefits of SMRs include safety features, ranging from size to
advanced technological improvements.173 Wide-scaled SMR deployment
could also have great socio-economic benefits, including job growth that
would benefit local communities.174 SMRs have furthermore been
recognized as essential for energy security, and as cost-effective in the
fight against the effects of climate change175 as the low emissions basis
of SMRs makes this technology a lucrative alternative to traditional
nuclear power production.176
The nuclear industry is now at an exciting crossroads; many of the
current reactors are subject to the prolonging of their licensing to
operate.177 Some of these nuclear projects can have a life-span of up to
80 years.178 Thus, rather than extending the life-span of these
conventional reactors, SMRs should be recognized as an exciting
alternative to the next deployment of reactors.
2. Current market for SMR’s
Because of the misguided principle of economies of scale, the
nuclear industry has focused on constructing LRs and not yet built any
SMRs.179 However, many companies ranging from start-ups to mature
energy companies are investing and participating in the development of
SMRs.180 One company at the forefront of SMR deployment in the US is
NuScale, a company that has been trying to build a 60 MWe SMR based
on PWR technology.181 NuScale’s reactor is an integrated module,
factory manufactured and transportable to the desired location.182 The
reactor also has new safety features providing a high level of
proliferation resistance and safety value.183 It can also be constructed as a
173

See generally Vujic, supra note 146.
Repka, supra note125 62, at 10265.
175
Iyer, et al., supra note 37, at 152 (“We find that the costs of achieving a 2° degree
target are lower with SMRS than without.”).
176
BENEFITS, supra note 149.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
See Mignacca, supra note 125, at 1.
180
See Repka, supra note 62, at 10248 (explaining different companies currently
developing SMR technology).
181
NUSCALE, https://www.nuscalepower.com/about-us, (last visited Sept. 3, 2020).
182
“Nuscale is an integrated module, factory manufactured, transportable by rail, truck or
barge, with dimensions of 15 m by 4.5 m, and the weight of 400 tons. It also has a robust
seismic design with its structure composed almost entirely out of concrete, with well
arranged shear walls and diaphragms which provide high rigidity. . . ” Vujic et al., supra
note 146, at 291.
183
Id.
174
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multi-module power plant.184 NuScale has submitted a design
certification (“DC”) application for its reactor, which is still under
review by the NRC.185 SMR use is also anticipated from other
companies. For example, since 2016 a local utility in Utah has attempted
to acquire a license to site such a reactor and become the first customer
of SMR technology.186 The first US SMR Boiling Water Reactor
(“BWR”) is now under development.187 Internationally there have been
many initiatives as well to develop and deploy SMR technology.188
3. SMRs and the NRC licensing regime
The nuclear industry is predominantly regulated by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (“NRC”),189 while the Department of Energy
(“DOE”) plays a minor role in research and development of nuclear
energy.190 A core feature of the work undertaken by the NRC is to certify
and approve reactor designs.191 There are currently two licensing
pathways for nuclear power plants: part 50, and part 52.192 Part 52 was
created as an attempt to standardize and streamline the heavily criticized
part 50 licensing regime,193 under which all current reactors are
licensed.194 Many critiques had reached the NRC and about the
regulatory framework under part 50 being slow, bureaucratic,

184
“A 540 MWe power plant could be comprised of 12 independent 45 MWe modules,
each with its own dedicated steam generator.” Id; see also Ingersoll, et al., Nuscale Small
Modular Reactor for Co-generation of Electricity and Water, 340 DESALINATION 84, 85–
86 (2014).
185
Design Certification Application, NRC (May 14, 2020),
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/nuscale.html.
186
Dan Yurman, Utah Utility Selects Idaho Site for NuScale SMR, NEUTRON BYTES
(Aug. 12, 2016), https://neutronbytes.com/2016/08/12/utah-utility-selects-idaho-site-fornuscale-smr/; UTAH ASSOCIATED MUNICIPAL POWER SYSTEMS (UAMPS) CARBON FREE
POWER PROJECT (CFPP), https://www.nuscalepower.com/projects/carbon-free-powerproject (last visited June 2020).
187
Office of Nuclear Energy, First U.S. Small Modular Boiling Water Reactor Under
Development (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/ne/articles/first-us-small-modularboiling-water-reactor-under-development#:~:text=BWRX%2D300%20small%20
modular%20reactor.&text=GE%20Hitachi%20(GEH)%20is%20expanding,development
%20in%20the%20United%20States.
188
For international development of SMR technology see Tscherning, supra note 46.
189
10 C.F.R. §1.1(a) (2018).
190
DOE, Nuclear, https://www.energy.gov/science-innovation/energy-sources/nuclear.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
EISEN, supra note 22, at 435.
194
Id. at 435.
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complicated, and requiring double regulation, leading to an outcry for
reform from members of the industry.195
Part 52 introduced the Combined License (“COL”) to mitigate the
effect of double regulation that exists in part 50.196 Under part 52, the
licensee has the voluntary option to apply for a DC. If approved, the
NRC will issue a standard DC in the form of a rule that is added as an
appendix to part 52 and is valid for fifteen years.197 The DC enables
companies seeking a COL to entirely avoid design issues, or at least
resolve these types of issues early in the licensing process.198 Hence, this
is an attempt to resolve many of the problems inherent in part 50
licensing regime. Other applicants in the COL process can use already
pre-approved and certified nuclear power plant designs.199
The COL licensing process offers other benefits for the licensee to
streamline the regulatory procedure. Alongside the DC, a licensee could
apply for an Environmental Site Permit (“ESP”) for the proposed siting
location. Similar to the DC, the ESP is valid for 10-20 years from the
date that it is issued and may be renewed for an additional period.200
Also new to part 52 is the Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance
Criteria (“ITAAC”).201 If all ITAAC tests are passed related to siting, no
party can raise last-minute objections related to the project.202
IV.

STANDARDIZATION, NUCLEAR VENDORS, AND "OFF-THESHELF-NUCLEAR"

Lack of design standardization is a significant factor hampering the
development of nuclear energy in the United States.203 The current
reactor fleet exists of unique, large, custom-made power plants, and
some of the issues with these plants could be resolved by design
standardization.204 To achieve greater standardization of the commercial

195

EISEN, supra note 22, at 436.
Id.
197
Id. at 445.
198
Id.
199
10 C.F.R. § 52.43 (2019).
200
“Once an ESP is issued for a specific site, the holder of the ESP may “bank” that site
for future construction of a new nuclear power plant. The ESP is valid from 10-20 years
from the date it is issued and may be renewed for an additional 10 to 20 years. EISEN,
supra note 22, at 437.
201
Id. at 33.
202
Id.
203
Mignacca, supra note 125, at 7.
204
Gundlach, supra note 80, at 2.
196
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nuclear power fleet, the concept of “Off-the-shelf-nuclear,” is
particularly noteworthy.205
This concept refers to the ability of nuclear energy providers to
purchase reactor designs from reactor vendors that have been preapproved by the NRC.206 Some companies could act as nuclear vendors
selling pre-approved designs to other companies looking to site and build
a nuclear power plant.207 To make this happen, the nuclear vendor must
first acquire a DC from the NRC. If one company could push-through the
dreaded licensing regime of nuclear power plants, then other companies
could then buy that design pre-approved.
A reactor vendor system could generate enormous benefits to the
nuclear industry, and it could significantly improve the licensing
process.208 Furthermore, new projects could capitalize on the experience
of already completed projects.209 If multiple projects move forward at a
similar time, the benefit of synergies between projects could be utilized
by the nuclear industry.210 SMRs, in particular, are interesting as they
incorporate many features that could assist in creating more efficient
design certification.211
A nuclear vendor cannot merely build and ship a standard plant that
is pre-approved without the buyer and operator taking over
responsibility.212 If it were possible for an international reactor vendor to
ship standard SMR technology that is pre-approved internationally
205
“Off-the-shelf,” a term most likely coined by Admiral Hyman G. Rickover in a speech
delivered before Congress on June 5, 1953: AEC Authorizing Legislation: Hearings
Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1702 (1970) (stating that “[a]n academic
reactor or reactor plant almost always has the following basic characteristics: (1) it is
simple; (2) it is small; (3) it is cheap; (4) it is light; (5) it can be built very quickly; (6) it
is very flexible in purpose; (7) very little development will be required; it will use offthe-shelf components; (8) the reactor is in the study phase; it is not being built now; on
the other hand a practical reactor can be distinguished by the following characteristics:
(1) it is being built now; (2) it is behind schedule; (3) it requires an immense amount of
development on apparently trivial items; (4) it is very expensive; (5) it takes a long time
to build because of its engineering development problems; (6) it is large; (7) it is heavy;
(8) it is complicated”).
206
EISEN, supra note 22.
207
Sainati, supra note 137, at 1093; see also Tronea, European quest for standardization
of nuclear power reactors, 52 PROG. NUCL. ENERG. 159-63 (2010).
208
Sainati, supra note 137, at 1094.
209
“Standard plant designs could significantly simplify the licensing and construction of
new plants, by allowing new projects to capitalize on the experience of lead projects.”
Repka, supra note 62, at 10259.
210
Id.
211
Mignacca & Locatelli, supra note 125, at 7; see also Ramana et al., Licensing Small
Modular Reactors, 61 ENERGY J. 555, 555-64 (2013).
212
Sainati, supra note 137, at 1093–94.
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merely, then this would be a fantastic opportunity for the nuclear
industry.213 There is a long-standing debate over international
harmonization of nuclear-licensing processes; however, because of the
heterogeneity in national legal systems, an international licensing and
approval process becomes extremely difficult to achieve for nuclear
technology.214
A.

Costs of Licensing, A Case for Nuclear Vendors

Licensing a nuclear power plant is a highly costly and timeconsuming venture.215 Historically, receiving a DC from the NRC costs
tens of millions of dollars.216 For example, the DC process for the
AP1000 reactor took almost four years, resulting in fees of more than
$45 million,217 and General Electric’s ESBWE Reactor took more than
nine years and application fees of around $68 million.218 It is a fair
estimate to assume that a conventional custom-made nuclear power plant
can cost billions to construct with licensing fees of around $50-70
million.219 The high costs of licensing a nuclear power plant could be
related to the fee structure of the NRC, which in itself is a deterrent for
the development of innovative nuclear designs.220 It should be noted that
many of these costs are based on the economics of licensing
conventional LRs and could, therefore, be an inaccurate representation of
advanced nuclear technology such as SMRs.221
B.

Small Modular Reactors and Public Perception

Increased perception of need and benefit of nuclear power could
increase public tolerance of nuclear energy.222 The mass-deployment and
many benefits of SMRs over LRs could alleviate the focus on potential
danger and harm223 and assist in furthering the public acceptance of
213

Id. at 1094–95.
Id.
215
EISEN, supra note 22, at 819.
216
NRC, New Reactors Business Line Fee Estimates (2020),
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/new-licensing-files/nro-fee-transformationdata.pdf.
217
Repka, supra note 62, at 10258.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Slobe, supra note 126, at 754.
221
Id.
222
Slovic, supra note 88, at 196.
223
Id. at 150–51.
214
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nuclear energy and advanced reactor technology.224 The ability of SMR’s
to be produced in a factory and installed in remote off-grid locations
could hopefully enable local communities to embrace nuclear
technology, which is necessary for the development and deployment of
nuclear reactors.225 Smaller societies could, in the future, potentially
embrace the benefit of SMR technologies, which could benefit both
nuclear investment and reactor advancement.226 One author stated that
the community could potentially embrace SMRs as their “own” reactor,
and therefore lead to a change in the willingness to accept nuclear
energy.227 In consideration of the amount of work that one nuclear
reactor can do for a community, education initiatives, and public
programs for the understanding and benefits of nuclear energy are
essential. The public could further embrace the scalability of SMRs and
technological advancement of these reactors, to promote both base-load
and load-following units.228
From a public perception viewpoint, nuclear power plant accidents
are associated with the LR’s. SMRs are safer, use less radioactive fuels,
can be hidden from the common eye, and located more strategically to
make these reactors safer.229 For these reasons and more, it is likely that
the smaller size and opportunities of SMRs can allow for the nuclear
industry to overcome the negative public perception of nuclear energy as
harmful and dangerous.
C.

Corporate Demand for Energy and SMRs

Another area where SMRs could be of benefit is to assist in
satisfying the growing corporate demand for energy.230 The growth of

224
See Nuclear Energy Agency, SMALL MODULAR REACTORS: NUCLEAR ENERGY
MARKET POTENTIAL FOR NEAR-TERM DEPLOYMENT, 29–30 (2017).
225
Tyson R. Smith, Nuclear Licensing in the United States: Enhancing Public
Confidence in the Regulatory Process. 18 J. RISK RESEARCH 1099, 1099 (2014) (“The
events of Fukushima and elsewhere underscore that public trust is critical to a successful
nuclear power program. In short, the public must have confidence in the regulator’s
ability to protect the public from nuclear power risks.”).
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Adrian Cho, Science, Smaller, Safer, Cheaper: One Company Aims to Reinvent the
Nuclear Reactor and Save a Warming Planet, SCIENCE MAG (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/02/smaller-safer-cheaper-one-company-aimsreinvent-nuclear-reactor-and-save-warming-planet.
230
Herman K, Trabish “How Utilities are Meeting Rising Corporate Demand for
Renewables, UTILITY DIVE (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-
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data centers around the world has been part of the substantial increase in
demand for corporate energy.231 Globalization and smart-technology
have resulted in increasing interconnectivity around the world.232 The
surge in global internet and data usage, alongside the digitalization of the
economy, has led to a drastic increase in cloud computing.233 According
to some estimations, “the cloud” will consume around 20% of global
energy consumption.234 From another perspective, the amount of energy
that will be used by data facilities is similar to the amount used by the
airline industry.235
There are over 500,000 data centers around the world today.236 Many
of these centers are located in remote locations and often use diesel
generators to provide a reliable power supply.237 As a result, the amount
of emissions from these facilities is enormous.238 Thus, every time we go
online shopping, stream videos, use social media, and more, there is a
toll taken on the environment, and the more digital the world becomes,
the more damage the environment takes.239

utilities-are-meeting-rising-corporate-demand-for-renewables/410717/ (December 14,
2015).
231
Derdus et al., Energy Consumption in Cloud Computing Environments, In Pan African
Conference on Science, Computing and Telecommunications (PACT), at 1 (2017),
https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/bitstream/handle/11071/5181/Energy%20consumption
%20in%20cloud%20computing%20environments.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
Even with efficiency measures in place, data centers will still consume a large amount of
global energy demand: Masanet, et al., Recalibrating Global Data Center-use Estimates,
SCIENCE MAG (Feb, 28, 2020), https://science.sciencemag.org/content/367/6481/984.
232
See generally James R. Faulconbridge & Jonathan V. Beaverstock, KEY CONCEPTS IN
GEOGRAPHY, 331–32 (Sage Publications Ltd., 2008); see also Joseph E. Stiglitz,
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003).
233
What is cloud computing?, Microsoft, https://azure.microsoft.com/e-us/overview/whatis-cloud-computing/ (last visited August 20, 2020).
234
Naomi Xu Elegant, The Internet Cloud Has a Dirty Secret, FORTUNE (Sep. 2019),
https://fortune.com/2019/09/18/internet-cloud-server-data-center-energy-consumptionrenewable-coal/.
235
Fred Pearce, Energy Hogs: Can World’s Huge Data Centers be Made More
Efficient?, YALE ENV’T. 360 (2018), https://e360.yale.edu/features/energy-hogs-canhuge-data-centers-be-made-more-efficient (April 3, 2018).
236
DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE,
https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2011/12/14/how-many-data-centersemerson-says-500000 (last visited Sept. 3, 2020).
237
Andy Lawrence, Data Centers Without Diesel Generators: The Groundwork is Being
Laid…, UPTIME INSTITUTE (Dec. 2019), https://journal.uptimeinstitute.com/data-centerswithout-generators-the-groundwork-is-being-laid/.
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Nature (Sep. 12, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06610-y .
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1. Power Purchase Agreements and ownership of clean energy
Through so-called Power Purchase Agreements (“PPA”) many data
companies have made investments in solar and wind energy.240 Data
companies have also acquired ownership of solar and wind farms
directly.241 The energy strategy employed by these companies seems to
be that through PPA’s, and ownership of clean power plants in
combination with battery technology, these companies will be able to
employ clean energy solutions to their data facilities. However, it should
be recognized that PPA’s are not a guarantee for an entirely clean supply
of energy.242 Many data companies have further pledged a reduction in
the use of diesel generation, but some of them have failed in their
ambition to become cleaner.243
2. SMRs and data centers
SMR technology could potentially be an option for reliable on-site
energy for data centers. The application of SMR technology to satisfy
corporate demand for energy is not a novel idea. In Poland, a company
named Synthos has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”)
with GE Hitachi for the construction of a small modular reactor.244 The
purpose of this venture is to acquire clean and reliable electricity.245 Data
240
Daniel Oberhaus, Amazon, Google, Microsoft: Here’s Who Has the Greenest Cloud,
WIRED (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/amazon-google-microsoft-greenclouds-and-hyperscale-data-centers/. for an overview of an example PPA, see Bonneville
Power Administration, Example of a Power Purchase Agreement, We’ve got the Power,
Big Business sees the Promise of Clean Energy, The Economist (June 2017),
https://www.economist.com/business/2017/06/10/big-business-sees-the-promise-ofclean-energy.
241
Amazon, Renewable Energy, AMAZON.com,
https://sustainability.aboutamazon.com/sustainable-operations/renewable-energy. See
Amazon’s climate strategy.
242
EISEN, supra note 22, at 768 (noting that “long-term PPAs do not determine which
plants actually supply power to the grid”).
243
Lawrence, supra note 249. Will Calvert, Amazon is Breaking its Renewable Energy
Commitments, Greenpeace Claims, DATA CENTERED DYNAMICS (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.datacenterdynamics.com/en/news/amazon-breaking-its-renewable-energycommitments-greenpeace-claims/.
244
Jack Unwin, GE Hitachi to Partner with Synthos on Small Modular Reactor in
Poland, POWER TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.powertechnology.com/news/ge-hitachi-synthos-poland/. See also GE Reports, GE Hitachi
Nuclear Energy Announces Small Modular Reactor Technology Collaboration in Poland,
GE NewsRoom (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ge-hitachinuclear-energy-announces-small-modular-reactor-technology-collaboration.
245
Unwin, supra note 244.
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companies could potentially follow Synthos and see the potential of
applying SMRs to their facilities. Many data companies are highly
capitalized and include some of the world’s largest organizations; if
anyone could assist in SMR development, these companies seem to be a
suitable candidate.246
CONCLUSION
Whether nuclear energy will play a role in the energy transition
towards a low-carbon future remains uncertain. In comparison to other
fuels, unfair risk perceptions have forced the nuclear industry to
internalize the negative externalities associated with nuclear energy.
Likely, many problems inherent in the production of nuclear energy in
the United States are linked to the focus on constructing large reactor
facilities. For revitalization of the US nuclear industry to occur, the focus
should be placed on the wide-scale deployment of SMRs. These reactors
incur many benefits from economic to technological and are designed to
make up for many of the existing problems associated with conventional
nuclear power plants.
Furthermore, SMRs can theoretically assist energy companies in
overcoming many of the dreaded hurdles within the nuclear licensing
process, and their application potential is more significant than the siting
of conventional custom-made extensive reactor facilities. One example
of such potential lies in the combination of SMRs and data facilities to
provide a reliable and clean source of energy for data companies to run
their data and storage facilities.
If nuclear vendors can push through the licensing regime and then resell their reactors “off-the-shelf,” this would be a fantastic opportunity
for the nuclear industry to be revitalized. In conclusion, significant
reactor facilities function and are safe, but reasons remain that challenge
efforts to site and construct them. Furthermore, it is important that the
nuclear industry takes into account and tries to re-think the negative
public perception of large reactor facilities, and this would be best done
through the wide-scale deployment of SMR technology.

246

See Nathaniel Bullard, Tech Investments Are Powering Up Clean Energy,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-0929/tech-companies-are-big-spenders-on-renewable-energy.
87

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol11/iss1/3

32

Stenberg: Energy Transitions and the Future of Nuclear Energy: A Case for S
Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy

[Page left intentionally blank]

88

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2020

33

